20 years of Pokhran II nuclear test: This is how India became a mighty nuclear power

20 years of Pokhran II nuclear test: This is how India became a mighty nuclear power

Twenty years ago, on May 11, 1998, India conducted the landmark Pokhran-II nuclear test at the Pokhran Test Range in Rajasthan’s Jaisalmer district.

Twenty years ago, on May 11, 1998, India conducted the landmark Pokhran-II nuclear test at the Pokhran Test Range in Rajasthan’s Jaisalmer district. A series of five nuclear explosions were conducted between May 11 and May 13, 1998, under the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government. The second Pokhran Nuclear Test was conducted after Smiling Buddha in 1974. May 11, the day of first of the five explosions during the Pokhran-II nuclear weapons testing, was officially declared as the National Technology Day. For Pokhran II nuclear test, more than 100 scientists and technicians worked under the leadership of Late President APJ Abdul Kalam who was the Scientific Adviser to the prime minister and Head of the DRDO. The five nuclear devices detonated during the Pokhran II Test were Shakti I, II, III, IV and V.
What did the Indian government say on May 11, 1998
In an official statement by Ministry of External Affairs, India conducted three underground nuclear tests in the Pokhran range. The tests conducted were with a fission device, a low yield device and a thermonuclear device. The measured yields are in line with expected values. Measurements have also confirmed that there was no release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. These were contained explosions like the experiment conducted in May 1974 (Smiling Buddha)
What happened on May 13, 1998
In continuation of the planned programme of underground nuclear tests that began on May 11, two more sub-kiloton nuclear tests were carried out at Pokhran range at 12:21 PM on the May 13, 1998. The tests were carried out to generate additional data for improved computer simulation of designs and for attaining the capability to carry out subcritical experiments. The tests were fully contained with no release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. The nuclear tests on May 13 completed the planned series of tests.
What happened after Pokhran II Nuclear tests
The United States imposed sanctions on India, cutting off all aid except humanitarian assistance. The then President Bill Clinton signed official papers imposing the measures on India for carrying out nuclear tests. The two new nuclear explosions drew further world condemnation. Pakistan had bitterly condemned the latest Indian tests. Pakistani Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan had said the Indian leadership seemed to have gone berserk and was acting in a totally unrestrained way.
How India managed to fool CIA
What made the nuclear tests stand out was the manner inwhich India outsmart US and CIA. All the five tests went undetected under the nose of CIA. DRDO officials carefully examined the timing of the satellite positions over India and worked only at night when chances of detection were very low. The scientists worked in army uniforms during day. In fact, pot-nellied scientists were not included in the team so that they can gel with the pfysically fit soldiers. CIA later admitted their failure to predict India’s big nuclear tests.
“Pokhran II- Proof of India’s Nuclear Prowess”
On April 29 this year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi hailed Pokhran-II nuclear tests carried out 20 years ago saying it established India’s nuclear prowess in the world. “On May 11, 1998, at India’s western end a nuclear test was conducted in Pokhran, Rajasthan. It has been 20 years since Pokhran and this test was done on Buddha Purnima with the blessings of Lord Buddha. India’s test was not only successful but in a way, India had demonstrated its might in the field of science and technology. We can also say the date has been engraved in the history of India as a demonstration of its military power,” PM Modi had said in his monthly radio address “Mann Ki Baat”. The prime minister pointed out that Lord Buddha had said that inner strength was necessary to live in peace and India, too, acquired nuclear strength to live in peace.
……………………………

Pokhran tests: 20 years on, here’s how India became a legitimate nuclear power

Lalit Mansingh was secretary (west) in the external affairs ministry in May 1998 when India conducted five nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, at the Pokhran range in Rajasthan.
The first three detonations took place simultaneously at 3.45pm on May 11. These included a 45 kT thermonuclear device, a 15kt fission device and a 0.2 kt sub-kiloton (which is less than a kiloton) device. The two nuclear devices detonated simultaneously on May 13 were also in the sub-kiloton range, 0.5 kT and 0.3 kT.
The test happened months after then foreign secretary K Raghunath told his US counterpart that India did not have any intention of testing a nuclear device. “The test was a secret, known only to five people; that certainly did not include me or even the foreign secretary,” Mansingh recalled.
The test opened floodgates of trouble for India: sanctions, economic and military, and interactional isolation. “It was certainly the biggest challenge Indian foreign policy establishment faced in a long, long time”, said Mansingh, who later became the foreign secretary as well as the country’s envoy to the US.
The immediate challenge was to mitigate international opposition and eventually bridge the trust gap with the US. Immediately after the tests, the US suspended foreign secretary-level talks; over the following two years, it put more than 200 Indian entities under the sanctions list.
The list included not only the facilities of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and entities of Department of Space, but also a clutch of private sector firms that had worked for them.
The now fabled discussions between Strobe Talbot, then US secretary of state, and then foreign minister Jaswant Singh followed — they were held in seven countries, 10 cities, and included 14 rounds of talks.
For Americans and the west, India was gatecrashing the nuclear club. With Pakistan seeking nuclear parity, the Americans feared South Asia would become a nuclear flashpoint. A great deal of the Talbot-Singh conversation covered this ground.

“I hope my regard for the way Jaswant advanced his nation’s interests and sought, as he put it, to harmonise US-India relations speaks for itself…,” Talbot wrote in his book Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb. “These talks provided the basis for the next stage of India-US relationship, and eventually paved the way for the India-US nuclear deal,” says Mansingh.

The nuclear deal, pursued by the Manmohan Sigh-George Bush Jr administrations, resulted in India getting a seat at the nuclear high table for all practical purposes without signing the Non-Proliferation treaty. The framework for this agreement was a July 18, 2005, joint statement by then Indian PM Manmohan Singh and then US President George W Bush.
This led to India putting some of its reactors under the India-specific International Atomic Energy (IAEA) safeguards, and getting a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the elite club of countries that deals with trade in nuclear technology and fissile materials.
The NSG waiver on September 2008 lifted an over three-decade, US-led world embargo on civilian nuclear cooperation with India that was brought upon India after it first tested a nuclear device in 1974 and in 1998. The waiver earned India the right to trade for civilian nuclear fuel and technology.
It was expected to give a boost to nuclear power in India’s energy basket. Back at the time, India’s 22 nuclear plants were operating at under 40% capacity. India subsequently started signing deals with foreign countries to start nuclear parks in the country. It signed agreements with Russia, France and the US. Except with the Russians, the other plans ran into a host of issues ranging from land acquisition to liability.
The share of nuclear power in the total electricity generated in the country in the year 2016-17 was a mere 3.05%. According to the data from Department of Atomic Energy, the present installed nuclear capacity is 6780 MW and it will reach 13480 MW by the year 2024 with the completion of projects under construction.
In June 2017, the Government accorded administrative approval and financial sanction for 12 more reactors with a total capacity of 9000 MW that are scheduled to be completed progressively by 2031. Together with the capacity being implemented by BHAVINI, the total nuclear power capacity will reach 22480 MW by the year 2031. “But we all hoped the nuclear power production in the country would see a quantum jump because of the deal. That didn’t happen”, said Mansingh.
 
……………………..

wenty years ago, on May 11, 1998, India took a leap into the unknown world of nuclear weapon powers with the tests at Pokhran. Though the decision was taken after great deliberation and with preparation, how the reaction of the world would affect the future of India was unknown. But today, it is certain that the action was timely and inevitable.

Obstacles removed
India has reason to be satisfied over having accomplished many of the objectives of Pokhran II. Indian diplomacy triumphed in turning a grave crisis into an opportunity by securing legitimacy for its nuclear arsenal and removing obstacles in generating nuclear power. But the hasty enactment of a liability law, which inhibited nuclear trade, and the setback globally to nuclear power on account of the Fukushima disaster stood in the way of India benefitting fully from Pokhran II and the subsequent agreements reached. The fact, however, remains that the 1998 tests and the subsequent nuclear deal have brought India to the nuclear mainstream and opened up the global nuclear market for development of nuclear power without signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The tests shocked the world, particularly because they were done with utmost secrecy and the India-U.S. ties hit rock bottom. For nearly two months, the U.S. refused to have any dialogue with India and implemented the Glenn Amendment for the first time. Newer sanctions were imposed, and at one point it looked that relations would never recover.
The talks between U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh over the next two years were the most comprehensive dialogues India had with the U.S. on its nuclear policy, including the threat perception and future plans for security. India was anxious to have the sanctions lifted, but Mr. Singh sought to delink sanctions from the security dialogue, not to be pressurised to take quick decisions. Mr. Talbott began by insisting that the objective was to get India to sign the NPT. Then he listed five benchmarks as non-proliferation goals to normalise relations: signing the CTBT, halting production of fissile material, strategic restraint, strengthening export control regimes, and normalisation of relations with Pakistan. These were strongly rejected by India, but the talks proceeded on the assumption that India’s security concerns should be fully understood and that India would take certain measures to suit its new status. But, in effect, India met the U.S. demands more than half way, leading to an understanding, which led to President Bill Clinton’s visit to India and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to the U.S. in 2000. India refused to sign the CTBT, but declared a moratorium on testing; agreed to join the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations without halting fissile material production; reaffirmed minimum deterrent without giving any number of warheads; and agreed to strengthen export controls. Additionally, India declared no-first-use and commitment to disarmament. Though no deal could be struck, the foundation was laid for what became the nuclear deal in 2008.
Though India placed its civilian nuclear facilities under perpetual safeguards, its nuclear assets remained fully insulated against external scrutiny and interference. India secured rights to receive uninterrupted nuclear fuel supplies as a trade-off against safeguards. It kept open its right to acquire advanced enrichment and reprocessing technologies, although it would require bilateral negotiations with the U.S. and others. India’s sovereign right to test a nuclear device in the future has remained intact, although the deal would be in jeopardy in such an eventuality. Presidents George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh remained committed to the deal throughout the negotiations and made decisive interventions at crucial moments. Apart from the specific gains in the nuclear area, the new India-U.S. partnership, which promised investment and high technology, was a turning point in Indian foreign policy. On the negative side, the deal generated mistrust in Russia and China, which had to be dealt with in future years.
Reality check
Ten years after signing the deal, its gains and losses have proved much less game-changing than it was hoped in 2008. Though not a champion of the deal as a Senator, President Barack Obama committed himself to the implementation of the deal as part of his strategy to build good relations with India. But his personal affinity to the NPT and non-proliferation made him reluctant to interpret the 123 Agreement liberally. The expectation was that the prospect of nuclear trade with India would be a great attraction, but in 2009 Mr. Obama gave clear indication to his advisers that he would not sacrifice his non-proliferation agenda for commercial reasons. Much has happened since then, but the fact remains that there has been no nuclear trade till today. India’s nuclear liability law, forced on the government by critics of the deal, became a smokescreen for the U.S. to not supply nuclear material to India. The repeated declarations about a way out of the liability law and plans to set up American reactors in India after Narendra Modi became Prime Minister have not changed the lack of enthusiasm in the U.S. on nuclear trade with India. In any case, the situation has become more volatile after Donald Trump became U.S. President.
Another major event that has shaken confidence in the value of nuclear power in India’s energy mix was the Fukushima disaster. It has changed the global nuclear power scenario beyond recognition, though India has maintained that it is “business as usual”. The government’s recent decision to build more indigenous reactors points to the fact that the dream of imported nuclear reactors dotting India has disappeared. India’s focus has rightly shifted to solar and other new sources of energy.

Want to be the first one to receive the new Content?

Enter your email address below and we'll send you the notes straight to your inbox.

Thank You For Subscribing

This means the world to us!

Spamming is not included! Pinky promise.